Roger Olson's Against Calvinism is the companion volume to Michael Horton's For Calvinism (both
published by Zondervan). The two are the latest entries in the
long-standing Calvinist/Arminian debate, and the debate shows no signs
of resolution or letting up—despite the efforts of these recent salvos. I
believe Olson's case is particularly weak and I will give my reasons
for the assessment below. But first, I will offer readers a short and
standard review of Olson's book. That is, I will present Olson's aims,
summarize the content of the book and briefly summarize the chapters. I
will make some brief and general criticisms, but I will save the
strongest and most in-depth for part two.
Part I
Roger Olson wants his readers to know that he's not against Calvinists as persons, but he feels he needs to give their doctrines a strong "No!" His main target is identified as neither Reformed theology en toto, nor Calvinism en toto, but a subset of doctrines ostensibly recognized as Calvinism: TULIP (the acronym stands for Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints). To be more precise, Olson does not even have the conjunction of TULIP in his sights. Thus by "against Calvinism," what Olson means is that he "is opposed to any and every belief system that includes the 'U,' the 'L,' and/or the 'I' in TULIP" (62). But even here it's not exactly clear what he's against. He writes strongly against each of these three, and seems to suggest that he is against them individually and jointly. He claims that the 'U' and the 'I' "always appear together, but is most strongly against the 'L.' But then he claims that "the 'L' . . . is necessarily implied by the 'U' and the 'I'" (62). This doesn't seem right. Olson seems to suggest that if a Calvinist were a universalist like Barth, then the moral charges filed against God would vanish. And there are universalists who hold to the 'U' and the 'I.' Olson would need to show how those necessarily imply the 'L.' I for one welcome that argument as it would force all universalists to become libertarians—which in turn would make it very hard for God to ensure universalism! In any event, I can't see how the 'U' and the 'I' necessarily imply the 'L,' though it makes it more hard to deny the 'L' if you affirm a populated eternal hell. So it might look as if he really only has issue with the 'L,' or the 'L' conjoined with the 'U' and the 'I.' However, Olson does say that any form of determinism or compelling does not allow for real relationships of any kind (cf. pp. 166-168). This obtains with the 'I.' And with the 'U,' Olson claims that "sheer logic" shows that 'U' implies God makes an arbitrary choice" (115). Presumably God can't make arbitrary choices, and so 'U' can't obtain. So it appears to me that Olson is against "ULI" individually and jointly. Keep Reading...
Part I
Roger Olson wants his readers to know that he's not against Calvinists as persons, but he feels he needs to give their doctrines a strong "No!" His main target is identified as neither Reformed theology en toto, nor Calvinism en toto, but a subset of doctrines ostensibly recognized as Calvinism: TULIP (the acronym stands for Total depravity, Unconditional election, Limited atonement, Irresistible grace, and Perseverance of the saints). To be more precise, Olson does not even have the conjunction of TULIP in his sights. Thus by "against Calvinism," what Olson means is that he "is opposed to any and every belief system that includes the 'U,' the 'L,' and/or the 'I' in TULIP" (62). But even here it's not exactly clear what he's against. He writes strongly against each of these three, and seems to suggest that he is against them individually and jointly. He claims that the 'U' and the 'I' "always appear together, but is most strongly against the 'L.' But then he claims that "the 'L' . . . is necessarily implied by the 'U' and the 'I'" (62). This doesn't seem right. Olson seems to suggest that if a Calvinist were a universalist like Barth, then the moral charges filed against God would vanish. And there are universalists who hold to the 'U' and the 'I.' Olson would need to show how those necessarily imply the 'L.' I for one welcome that argument as it would force all universalists to become libertarians—which in turn would make it very hard for God to ensure universalism! In any event, I can't see how the 'U' and the 'I' necessarily imply the 'L,' though it makes it more hard to deny the 'L' if you affirm a populated eternal hell. So it might look as if he really only has issue with the 'L,' or the 'L' conjoined with the 'U' and the 'I.' However, Olson does say that any form of determinism or compelling does not allow for real relationships of any kind (cf. pp. 166-168). This obtains with the 'I.' And with the 'U,' Olson claims that "sheer logic" shows that 'U' implies God makes an arbitrary choice" (115). Presumably God can't make arbitrary choices, and so 'U' can't obtain. So it appears to me that Olson is against "ULI" individually and jointly. Keep Reading...
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